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Home Rule and Land Use Control
Henry J. Crawford
UNUSUAL OPPORTUNITIES IN OHIO FOR THE DEVELOPMENT
OP URBAN RENEWAL AND OTHER LAND USE CONTROLS

In Ohio, the legal power of municipal corporations to undertake and
carry out urban renewal programs and the related activities of land use
planning and control is not dependent on the existence or enactment of
statutes by the state legislature or on the adoption of a charter. The
authority for these functions of municipal government is the self-executing constitutional grant of power to exercise the legislative sovereignty
of the state in all matters of
THE AUTHOR (Ph.B., Kenyon College, LL.B.,
Harvard University, LL.D., Bowling Green
State University) is a Cleveland attorney.

local self-government. This affords an unusual opportunity in
Ohio to develop the objectives

of municipal self-government,
and to devise and put into effect measures to combat the growing blight
that comes from haphazard urban growth, from neglect, and from indifference to the public welfare. Questions of substantial doubt in the
undertaking of particular urban renewal projects or of other land use
controls may well arise; but these, except as to procedural matters, will
involve fundamental constitutional questions, not questions as to whether
the state legislature has seen fit to authorize by statute the proposed
project or controls, or to curtail the power of municipalities, or whether
the municipality has transcended some statutory power delegated to it, or
has adopted, with or without statutory sanction, a charter for its government.
Home Rule in Ohio
Municipal home rule in Ohio was written into the constitution in
1912. Article XVIII, section 3 provides as follows:
Municipalities shall have authority to exercise all powers of local
self-government and to adopt and enforce within their limits such local
police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in conflict with
general laws.

This section contains two separate grants of power. The first is the
authority to exercise all powers of "local self-government" and is not
restricted by the final clause of this section relating to conflict with

1962]

Crawford, Land Use Control

general laws.1 The second is "to adopt and enforce within their limits
such local police, sanitary and other similar regulations, as are not in
conflict with general laws." To be invalid as in conflict with general
laws, the local regulation must conflict-with a state regulation; the
legislature may not by general law deny or restrict the municipal power
to adopt such regulations. It may do so only by enacting laws imposing
regulations which are themselves in conflict with those of the muncipality.2
Therefore, within the entire area of "local self-government," munidpalities can determine for themselves what is necessary for the public
welfare and can adopt the means for carrying out programs they determine to be necessary, without any statutory authority. Generally speaking, this power is exercisable by municipalities, as far as concerns the
question of public purpose, to the same extent as it is or may be in other
states through the enactment of statutory authority to undertake a program for the public welfare. In other words, if a statute (absent the
home rule power) could constitutionally authorize municipal land use
controls and urban renewal projects as a part of them, municipalities in
Ohio can adopt and enforce such controls and effect such projects without any statute at all.
It has been somewhat difficult for officials, planning consultants,
and municipal legal advisors fully to appreciate that such statutory authority is completely superfluous. This is no doubt due to the common
understanding that municipalities in the United States have only such
powers as are conferred by statute. That is the usual rule,' but it has
not been true in Ohio since 1912, when home rule was written into the
constitution.
The grant of home rule power is self-executing and plenary except
only as limited by parallel constitutional provisions. It supersedes the
prior concept that municipal powers depend upon grants by the General
Assembly. The general course of decisions in the Ohio Supreme Court
establishes beyond question that a municipality's power of local selfgovernment prevails in local affairs. Those decisions also establish that
a municipality, acting through its duly constituted legislative authority,
may undertake and carry out all programs for municipal improvement
and may exercise all of the substantive powers of the sovereign when
carrying out the city's governmental powers in the field of local self1. State ex rel. Leach v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 NE.2d 106 (1959); State ex rel.
Bidas v. Andrish, 165 Ohio St. 441, 136 N.E.2d 43 (1956); State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich,
159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.2d 778 (1953).
2. Youngstown v. Evans, 121 Ohio St. 342, 168 N.E. 844 (1929); Fremont v. Keating,
96 Ohio St. 468, 118 N.E. 114 (1917). For a ful discussion, see 3 FARIRELL-ELLis, OtIo
MUNICIPAL CODE §§1.29-.33 (11th ed. 1962).
3.

1 DILLON, MUNICIPAL CORPORAO NS

§

237 (5th ed. 1911).
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government.' All of these municipal powers are exercised without benefit of statutory authority, and, in some cases, in violation of statutory
restrictions upon the exercise of authority which were held to be not
within the areas in which the legislature was expressly authorized to impose restrictions.
Home Rule and Urban Renewal
These principles were recognized as applicable to an urban renewal
project in the leading Ohio case on the subject.5 The court had before
it an urban redevelopment project for the elimination of slum conditions
in the City of Cincinnati by acquiring and clearing an area and making
the land available for redevelopment and subsequent resale for redevelopment with restrictions as to use, designed to insure against occurrence of slum conditions. The court held, in the eighth syllabus of
the case:
Where a redevelopment project is within the lawful purposes of a
government, then such redevelopment project with respect to a slum
area in a city is within the lawful purposes of the city government.6
Upon this point the opinion of Judge Taft is helpful.

He said:

Obviously, if a redevelopment project such as that in the instant case
is within the lawful purposes of a government, then this redevelopment
project is within the lawful purposes of the local government of the
city of Cincinnati. There is no provision of the Ohio Constitution
which authorizes the interference by general laws with the exercise by
a municipality of its power of eminent domain, such as the provisions
of Section 3 of Article XVIII requiring that "local police, sanitary and
other similar regulations" be "not in conflict with general laws" and
such as the provisions of Section 13 of Artide XVIII authorizing the
passage of laws limiting certain other powers of government otherwise

vested in a municipality by section 3 of that article....
It follows that the questions, whether .the provisions of the Urban

Redevelopment Act have been complied with and whether that act is
constitutional, are not pertinent to a consideration of this case. 7
For this reason, the General Assembly, in 1961, repealed completely
4. State ex rel. Leach v. Redick, 168 Ohio St. 543, 157 N.E.2d 106 (1959) (lease of prop-

erty); Benjamin v. City of Columbus, 167 Ohio St. 103, 146 N.E.2d 854 (1957) (prohibition

of nuisance); Babin v. City of Ashland, 160 Ohio St. 328, 116 N.E.2d 580 (1953) (disposition of property); State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953)
(eminent domain); State ex rel. Gordon v. Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 NY.2d 225 (1951)
(off-street parking and non-debt bonds); State ex rel. McClure v. Hagerman, 155 Ohio St.
320, 98 N.E.2d 835 (1951) (membership fees); Angell v. City of Toledo, 153 Ohio St.
179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950) (income tax); State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Weiler, 101 Ohio
St. 123, 128 N.E. 88 (1920) (purpose of borrowing); Froelich v. City of Cleveland, 99
Ohio St. 376, 124 N.E. 212 (1919) (use of streets).

5. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
6. Id. at 14, 110 N.E.2d at 781.
7. Id. at 32-33, 110 N.E.2d at 789.
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the Ohio urban renewal statute, enacted in 1949, which purported to
authorize cities to undertake urban renewal projects. Consequently, there
is now no statute in Ohio authorizing municipal urban renewal undertakings. Before the 1961 repeal,9 there was the anomalous situation that
cities were purportedly authorized to carry on such projects, but with
the limitations imposed by the statute, while villages were authorized to
carry them on without any statutory limitations, as the state statute did
not apply to villages. It had been found that the purported grant of
urban renewal powers by the 1949 enactment contained conditions or
limitations which were interfering with the successful accomplishment
by cities of urban renewal programs. Some of those conditions or limitations were invalid or of doubtful validity; others imposed impracticable
restrictions. °
The conclusion to be drawn is that municipalities exercise directly
the sovereignty of the state in dealing with Ohio municipal problems
of urban renewal, planning, open space programs, zoning, building codes,
and other land use controls." There is the opportunity for each municipality to determine its own objectives and its concepts of desirable urban
growth, development, and redevelopment, without the difficulties, delays, or even impossibilities of obtaining statutory authority to act in the
area. Municipalities are free to try out new concepts for urban life and
environment and new means of accomplishing the objectives of the community. It is believed that probably nowhere else in the United States
does there exist equal freedom for municipal experiment for the promotion of the public welfare.
Responsibilities of Municipalities under Home Rule
Perhaps of greater importance are the consequences of the thrusting,
by the constitution, of the powers of local self-government upon municipal corporations. Such powers are necessarily accompanied by the cor8.

123 OHIO LAws 433 (1949), codified as Orto Rsv. CODE SS 725.01-.11.

9. 129 OHIo LAws, Senate Bill No. 254, effective April 24, 1961.
10. For example, adoption of a plan was made a condition of the exercise of the power;
a redevelopment plan could not contain less than four acres; two public hearings were required; notice was to be mailed to each owner of land in the area; land acquisition was to be
completed within two years, and disposition within six years; and leases could not extend
beyond three years or the date of completion of redevelopment work. 123 Omo LAWS
433 (1949), codified as OHIo R v. CODE S§ 725.01-.11.

11.

Urban renewal projects undertaken by counties require statutory authority, as counties

are not given home rule powers by the state constitution. (Counties may obtain some local
autonomy by adopting a charter pursuant to Ohio Constitution, article X, section 3). By statute
county commissioners have been granted broad powers for the elimination of slum and blighted areas and for their renewal. Omio REv. CODE §§ 303.26-.56 (Supp. 1961). However,

the powers of a county are expressly limited to areas outside of the corporate limits of any
municipality. OHo REv. CODE § 303.26 (Supp. 1961). To this date there has been no
urban renewal project put into execution by an Ohio county.
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responding duties of fulfilling the responsibilities of government and of
meeting the needs of the municipality. The people, by vesting such
power in each municipality, necessarily put upon each the duty to govern
itself according to its individual and particular needs in its local affairs.
No city or legislative body thereof can properly look to the state legislature or to other agencies to solve its own problems. The very force of
these duties and responsibilities requires that each municipality and its
legislative body shall undertake and carry out all measures determined
necessary to promote and to preserve the welfare of the community. 2
It cannot be emphasized too often or too strongly that Ohio municipalities have at hand, and within the powers given by direct constitutional
grant, the tools of government needed to plan and to put into effect
programs and activities that will combat the forces which have produced
urban blight, and which will continue to produce it if not arrested.
The legislative power of the state, as to matters of municipal local
self-government, that has been vested in municipalities includes the
power to employ all of the means of government that may be suitable
for accomplishing public purposes and promoting the health, welfare,
and economy of the inhabitants, subject only to limitations constitutionally imposed. There exists not only the power to make legislative
decisions of policy and determinations of the objectives to be attained,
but also the power to select the methods by which those objectives will
be attained. Only by the recognition by municipalities of their responsibilities for local self-government and by wise action to meet those responsibilities, will intervention by superior authority be avoided.
The decisions referred to above establish that municipalities in Ohio
may determine what is needed for the public welfare, and to implement
such determination, may expend public funds, levy taxes, borrow money,
acquire property by purchase or by eminent domain, dispose of property,
and construct public improvements. They may also regulate the use of
land by zoning, subdivision regulation, building codes and the like; they
may plan for municipal development and growth; and they may, by
direct action, acquire blighted areas and resell the land for orderly development. By agreement with other municipalities, for mutual advantage, they can jointly undertake projects in which they have a common beneficial interest 3 and develop plans for community growth and
12. Cf. State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Weiler, 101 Ohio St. 123, 128 N.E. 88 (1920),
where, concerning the use of the borrowing power, the court held, in the third syllabus:
"Each municipality assumes responsibility consonant with the authority conferred, and is
not only permitted but required to determine for itself the portion of its taxing and debt
incurring power which shall be used for any authorized municipal purpose, within such constitutional and legislative limitation."
13. The power to carry out cooperative undertakings does not depend upon statutory authority (such as, for example, OHIO REV. CODE § 715.02) but is derived from the constitution. This point was decided in unreported decisions of the Court of Common Pleas and
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elimination or prevention of blight so that future development in no one
of them will impair orderly and sound planning and development in
others.
This power of cooperation can be profitably employed today in
several critical areas, namely, water supply, storm and sanitary sewers,
and mass transportation. For example, substantial federal aid is now
provided to help solve the problems of mass transportation in metropolitan centers.' 4 Municipalities in Ohio which are alert may take prompt
advantage of this aid without any new enabling state legislation. 5 In
many metropolitan areas, however, adequate provision cannot economically be made to serve the needs of the people without greater municipal
cooperation.
As the problems of municipalities and metropolitan areas increase
with growing density of population and with ever expanding sprawl, it
does not seem unreasonable to predict that unless municipal corporations
use effectively their extensive powers to fulfill their duty to govern, the
state or the federal government, or both, will feel compelled to act. Ohio
cities and villages have an unusual opportunity to meet the challenge.
The tools of government are there; all that is needed is wise and courageous leadership, sound planning, and the will to accomplish.
LIMITATIONS ON MUNICIPAL POWER

The only limitations upon the exercise of "all powers of local selfgovernment" are those directly made by the constitution or those directly
authorized by the constitution to be made by the General Assembly.
These may be grouped as follows.
(1) Municipal powers may be exercised only for public purposes, 6
7
and must be exercised in the area of local self-government.
(2)
Municipalities may not lend their aid or credit' to private
persons or corporations.'" But this limitation is not violated by the
the Court of Appeals of Lake County in R. C. Young & Associatei v. City of Eastlake. Appeal
was dismissed for want of a debatable constitutional question, inasmuch as the action was
not brought within the time limit of Omo REv.CODE § 733.60. 166 Ohio St. 476, 14.3
N.E.2d 701 (1957). See 3 FARRELL-ELLIS, OHIO MUNICIPAL CODE § 5.3 (11th ed. 1962).
14. Housing Act of 1961, 75 STAT. 149, 165-66, 173-74, amending 42 U.S.C.A. § 1453, 40
U.S.C.A. § 461, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1492 (Supp. 1961).
15. Special provision is made in the Ohio Constitution, artide XVIII, section 4, for municipalities to acquire, construct, own, lease, and operate public utilities and to contract with
others for public utility products or services.
1- Loan Ass'n v. Topeka, 87 U.S. 655 (1875); City of Cleveland v. Ruple, 130 Ohio St.
465, 200 N.E. 507 (1936).
17. Village of Beachwood v. Board of Elections, 167 Ohio St. 369, 148 N.E.2d 921 (1958).
18. OHIO CONST. art. VIII, S 6; Village of Brewster v. Hill, 128 Ohio St. 343, 190 N.E.
766 (1934). It should be observed that the constitutional prohibition is against the enactment of laws authorizing municipalties and others to lend aid or credit. The court appar-
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process of acquiring and clearing slum and blighted areas and reselling
to developers.'" This is so, even if a city has already contracted to sell
the land to a developer prior to its acquisition.2"
(3)
Regulatory ordinances must be reasonable and have a substantial relationship to the health, morals, safety, or welfare of the
people.

21

(4) In the taking of private property for public purposes, compensation must be paid, and it must be assessed without deduction for benefits to any property of the owner.2 It was formerly held by the Ohio Supreme Court that this forbade the taking of private property except for
use by the public.2 ' However, when it sustained the power to acquire,
clear, and redevelop slum property, the court limited its decision in Pontiac Improvement Company v. Board of Commissioners,2' and gave
greater weight to the language of the constitutional provision, which
reads, "private property shall ever be held inviolate but subservient to the
public welfare."'" There is no language in the constitution prohibiting
the taking of private property except for use by the public.
(5) Exemption of property from taxation is controlled by article
XII of the Ohio Constitution. Municipalities are not granted the power
to make exemptions from taxation of property taxed according to value.
Accordingly, they may not provide tax exemption to encourage owners
to rehabilitate properties in deteriorating areas or to build housing for
low or middle income groups in areas cleared for redevolpment,
nor
6
may the legislature authorize exemption of such property.2
(6)
Some municipalities have limitations imposed in their own
charters adopted under article XVIII, section 7 of the Ohio Constitution,
ently recognized the difficulty in applying this limitation to an ordinance passed under the
home rule power, but concluded that the spirit, if not the letter, of the constitution would
be violated.
19. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
20. Grisanti v. City of Cleveland, 181 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), affirming 179
N.E.2d 798 (Ohio C.P. 1961), appeal dismissed, 173 Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d 568 (1962),
appeal docketed, No. 353, U.S., Aug. 20, 1962. See note 38 infra and accompanying text
where this important case is discussed in greater detail.
21. City of Akron v. Klein, 171 Ohio St. 207, 168 N.E.2d 564 (1960).
22. OHIO CONST. art. I, 5 19.
23. Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
24. Ibid.
25. OHIO CONST. art. I, 5 19, State ex rel. Bruestte v. Rich, note 19 supra.
26. The Ohio Constitution permits exemption from ad valorem taxes only for burying
grounds, public school houses, houses used exclusively for charitable purposes, and public
property used exclusively for any public purpose. OHIO CONsT. art. XII, § 2. Even public
property, when used for private purposes, may not be exempted by the legislature. Denison
University v. Board of Tax Appeals, 173 Ohio St. 429, 183 N.E.2d 773 (1962).
But as to
excise taxes, municipalities have the power to determine the subject matter and reasonable
classifications, except where limited by statute pursuant to the express grant of power conferred by article XIII, section 6, and article XVIII, section 13, of the Ohio Constitution.
Angell v. Toledo, 153 Ohio St. 179, 91 N.E.2d 250 (1950).
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which restrict officials in planning, developing, and carrying out urban
renewal projects and other public improvements, or which restrict the
borrowing power or the power to spend money.2" Such restrictions are
self-imposed by the community in question. In some municipalities, a
charter amendment conferring greater power on the elected or appointed
officials, or removing burdensome or prohibitive restrictions, may be required in order to permit effective urban renewal projects.
(7)
Article XVIII, section 3, of the Ohio Constitution requires
that local police, sanitary and similar regulations shall not conflict with
general laws enacted by the General Assembly. The determination to
acquire all of the property in a blighted area in order adequately to deal
with and eliminate the blight, and then to dispose of the land for redevelopment under a plan designed to prevent the recurrence of blight,
is an exercise of one or more of the powers of local self-government.
These activities are free from legislative control as to purpose, and are not
"regulations" which could be in conflict with general laws."
(8)
The constitution expressly authorizes in article XVIII, section
13, and article XIII, section 6, the enactment of laws to limit the power
of municipalities to levy taxes and incur debts for local purposes, and to
restrict their power of taxation, assessment, borrowing money, contracting debts, and loaning their credit, so as to prevent the abuse of such
power. This does not authorize the General Assembly to control the
activities for which municipalities may borrow money within debt limits."9
Nor does it authorize a statute prohibiting a municipality from borrowing money or from issuing obligations that do not constitute debt."
Thus, municipalities, within debt limitations, may issue general obligation
bonds to finance urban renewal projects3 1
Municipalities also may issue special obligations not constituting
debt, which do not pledge the credit or faith of the municipality. It has
been customary to use this type of financing for urban renewal projects
undertaken in conjunction with federal aid authorized by the Housing
Act of 1949, as amended.32 Special circumstances have arisen where
even such obligations in their customary form could not be issued with27. Cf. City of Sandusky v. City Comm'n, 56 Ohio App. 284, 11 N.E.2d 115, appeal dis.
missed, 132 Ohio St. 554, 9 N.E.2d 505 (1937).
28. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
29. State ex rel. City of Toledo v. Weiler, 101 Ohio St. 123, 128 N.E. 88 (1920).
30. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953); State ex rel.
Gordon v. Rhodes, 158 Ohio St. 129, 107 N.E.2d 206 (1952); State ex rel. Gordon v.
Rhodes, 156 Ohio St. 81, 100 N.E.2d 225 (1951).
31. Additional leeway is given by the provision that voted bonds for such purpose, not in
excess of two per cent of the tax duplicate valuation of the municipality, are totally excluded
in determining the statutory debt limitation. OHo REV. CoDE § 133.03.
32. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
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out the creation of a debt, but methods have been devised to solve the
problem.
(9)
Municipal powers may not be exercised in such a way as to
interfere with the state in the exercise of state functions."3 This limitation is one of importance and must be carefully considered in the planning of municipal projects and development so that they take into consideration highway and other improvements made or to be made by
the state.
These limitations are not as imposing as they may seem to be."
Municipalities, with their immense power of self-government, have been
able to plan and carry out urban renewal projects. Consideration of the
powers of government available clearly indicates that the means are at
hand, or can be developed as needed, to permit urban areas to attain,
through comprehensive and creative planning and effective regulations
and execution, conditions of living, working, and recreation that are acceptable to meet the standards of our citizens today.
POWERS OF MUNICIPALITIES TO
EFFECT LAND USE CONTROL

Under the grant of home rule power in Ohio, municipalities have all
the powers of local self-government. Particular powers are not set forth.
The comprehensive language of the grant necessarily means that municipalities have, and may exercise, all of the powers and tools of government to accomplish the purposes of local self-government, except only
as limited by express constitutional or constitutionally imposed restraints.
Specific Powers and Procedures
Thus, municipalities have the full power to plan their own development. This includes the power to make plans and maps of the corporation showing the general location and character of streets and other
public ways, parks, playgrounds and other public grounds, open spaces,
public buildings and public property, the general location of public and
private utilities, the general character of uses in the different areas of the
municipality, and the criteria or standards for design and construction of
33. City of Lakewood v. Thormyer, 171 Ohio St. 135, 168 N.E.2d 289 (1960); State ex rel.
Ohio Turnpike Comm'n v. Allen, 158 Ohio St. 168, 107 N.E.2d 345 (1952); State ex rel.
Ellis v. Blakemore, 116 Ohio St. 650, 157 N.E. 330 (1927).
34. It will be noted that only the last three limitations involve interference by the General
Assembly. As to matters of procedure, except where charters adopted under article XVIII,
section 7, of the constitution otherwise make provision, municipalities are to govern themselves in the method prescribed by statute pursuant to artide XVIII, section 2. Morris v.
Roseman, 162 Ohio St. 447, 123 N.E.2d 419 (1954). However, the substantive home rule
powers exist, whether or not a charter has been adopted. Perrysburg v. Ridgeway, 108 Ohio
St. 245, 140 N.E. 595 (1923).
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improvements. It is generally the function of a planning commission
to develop such a plan and make recommendations to the legislative
authority. Provision is made by statute for city and village planning
commissions. 5
The objective of creating a plan which deals fairly and effectively
with the community and with present conditions, and which will also, to
the maximum extent possible, contemplate future demands, can be most
nearly approached only if there is consultation with and advice from professional planners, lawyers skilled in public law, consulting engineers,
leaders in the community's business, commercial, and financial affairs,
leaders in education, public housing, welfare, and recreation, and administrators in charge of other government agencies having power to act in
the area.
Closely related to the function of planning is the zoning of a municipality under which districts are created for various uses of buildings and
other structures and premises. The Ohio statutes which are operative,
absent contrary charter provisions, vest the duty of developing zoning in
the planning commission, but the adoption of zoning must be by ordinance of the legislative authority of the municipality. 6
Also closely related to the function of planning is the power to impose restrictions on the subdividing of land within the municipality.
Most of the procedures for non-charter municipalities are set forth in
Ohio Revised Code chapter 711. Different procedures are available for
charter municipalities. However, in either case, the substantive power
of imposing regulations is granted as a part of the home rule power, subject to the qualification that such regulations must not conflict with
regulations imposed by the general laws of the state.
In the development of urban renewal projects, the power to acquire
and dispose of property is essential. It has been seen that Ohio munidpalities have such power as part of their local self-government. Absent
charter provisions, statutory procedures for the exercise of the powers
will be applicable. This is one of the reasons for the amendment in
1961 of the Ohio statutes so as to exempt such properties from the
requirement of competitive bidding when the property is sold or leased.'
35.

OHIO REV. CODE, ch. 713; but a munidpal charter may make different provisions.

36.

See O1HiO REV. CODE §5 713.07-.15.

The result of zoning is, of course, to restrain the

free use of land and to take away from land owners certain rights that would otherwise exist
for the use and development of their properties. This invasion is not the taking of property
without due process of law, nor a taking for which compensation must be made as long as
the zoning ordinance is not unreasonable and arbitrary. City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.,
272 U.S. 365 (1926); Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N.E. 30 (1925).
37. OHIO REV. CODE, § 721.28 (Supp. 1961), enacted by 129 OHio LAws, Senate Bill
No. 490, effective June 12, (1961). This was passed as a companion measure to the act
which repealed the Ohio urban renewal statute. 129 OHIo LAWS, Senate Bill No. 254, supra
note 9.
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The acquisition of undeveloped land for future development, for open
spaces, or for its preservation for public purposes against encroachment,
also falls within the first clause of article XVIII, section 3, of the constitution. With regard to this relatively new and as yet undefined field of
"open spaces," Ohio municipalities are in an unusual, and possibly
a
unique, position. To the extent that an open space program is developed
within constitutional limitations and for purposes serving the public or
the public welfare, municipalities in Ohio can put such programs into
complete execution without waiting for any statutory authority and
without having any statutory restrictions or definitions placed on the
purposes. They also have the ability to adapt their procedures and programs so as to take full advantage of federal aid. Moreover, they have
the ability to comply with changing federal policies and regulations without the delays or difficulties that would be encountered if statutory amendments were necessary in this rapidly developing field.
These powers of a municipality are so great that extreme care must be
taken to protect the rights of citizens and property owners and to be sure
that the municipality's plans give full and fair recognition both to the
public welfare and to the legitimate interests of the individual.
Exercise of Municipal Powers in
Land Use Controls
Urban Renewal
Of great significance is the recently established power of an Ohio
municipal legislative body to determine the existence of blight and the
need for an urban renewal project. It was held in Grisanti v. City of
Cleveland38 that the determination by the council of the City of Cleveland,
its legislative body, that a particular area is "not only a blighted, deteriorated and deteriorating area but is also a slum area detrimental to
and a menace to the public safety, health, morals, and general welfare. * * ""9 is conclusive upon the courts in the absence of fraud and
bad faith. As the municipal legislative body is exercising the legislative
authority of the State of Ohio, its determination of blight precludes the
re-examination of this question by the courts, and evidence to show that
council's determination is erroneous is properly excluded.
The court of appeals in Grisantipointed out that there is a substantial
distinction between cases involving solely the police power and cases
involving what is commonly referred to as a governmental purpose in
38. 181 N.E.2d 299 (Ohio Ct. App. 1962), affirming 179 N.E.2d 798 (Ohio C.P. 1961),
appeal disrmissed, 173 Ohio St. 386, 182 N.E.2d 568 (1962), appeal docketed, No. 353, U.S.,
Aug. 20, 1962. This case involved Cleveland's major downtown urban renewal project known
as Erieview I.
39. 179 N.E.2d at 807.
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the public interest. The court held that the urban renewal project before it was a public purpose in the nature of self-improvement under
the city's plan of urban renewal. The court concluded:
Thus it is dear that there is a real difference between a court's
examination of a legislative determination to see if it is "dearly erroneous" as in police power cases, and the substitution of its judgment
for that of the legislative body on a showing of fraud or gross abuse
of discretion when passing upon the validity of legislative action to carry
on public improvements in the interest of public welfare.40

Zoning and Restrictive Covenants
Traditionally, under the common law in this country and under the
state and federal constitutions, owners of property could do as they
pleased with it as long as they did not directly injure others in their persons or property. Before the advent of modern zoning, owners were
primarily subject only to rules which had grown up under the doctrine of
nuisance. Any use - or non-use - was the concern only of the owner,
unless there was some sufficiently serious and obnoxious direct effect
upon his neighbor (private nuisance) or his neighborhood (public
nuisance).
Undesirable, unsightly, and unpleasant uses appear to have been
equally legal in the open countryside, in the remote wilderness, and in
the town and large city, as long as the rules against nuisance were not
violated. Thus, commercial and manufacturing enterprises grew up side
by side with residences. The commercial and manufacturing developments were but the exercise of rights of ownership in land which every
owner enjoyed.
As urban areas became larger, as more people became offended,
and as more were adversely affected by conditions of land use regarded
as undesirable, we saw the origin and evolution of modern zoning. '
Zoning is a negative restraint, as is the law against nuisances, but zoning goes much further. Under zoning, the power of government is used
to permit or forbid various types of land uses. This is accomplished
under the so-called "police power" without compensation to the owners of
lands whose full use is restricted by the ordinances. Municipal officials
are enabled to plan for the future, and to project areas for future development consistent with concepts of safe and decent living.
However, either because the concept of zoning came into being so
late, or because of the non-enforcement of zoning ordinances and related building codes, or because of lack of good planning, or for all of
these reasons, and perhaps others, regulations of land use by prohibition
40. 181 N.E.2d at 303.
41. See City of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365 (1926).
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did not prevent the development in cities of conditions that are, by general consensus, deemed to be contrary to the general welfare. Residential
slums continued, grew, and became increasing menaces to the people,
both those within the slums and those outside its borders. Commercial
and industrial activities continued, have spread, and all too frequently
have become blighted.
It is now accepted that true slums may be dealt with by direct governmental intervention, as both regulatory laws and private efforts have
been found to be inadequate. There has been a growing acceptance of
the idea that non-slum blight may also be the subject of direct governmental action and that the people of a community do not have to
permit such blight to continue in their midst until properties become so
utterly defective that they can be closed and razed as nuisances.
One result of major significance in this direct approach will be to
supplement the zoning control of broad areas, by the control of specific
parcels of land for specific uses through contractual obligations imposed
on owners. We may well be on the way to substituting for zoning in
much of our urban areas, such contractual arrangements, which will become enforceable as covenants running with the land. It is of interest
that the prediction was made at the sessions on Urban Renewal and
Housing of the Practicing Law Institute held in New York City in June,
1962, that we will see the day when almost every real estate transaction
in our urban areas will be part of some urban renewal project. If that
be true, municipalities will assume control of particular uses of properties
considered individually, rather than general uses in general areas.
Non-conforming uses have given the courts great difficulty. It was
not considered a violation of constitutional rights to prohibit commercial
or industrial development on vacant land under a properly drawn zoning
ordinance. However, where land has been improved and is used for
lawful commercial or industrial purposes, it is natural that there would
be a different approach by the courts because of the substantial economic
investments that had been made on the land. An effort to solve this
problem is being made through ordinances that establish amortization
periods for non-conforming uses and prohibit the non-conforming use
after the expiration of the period. The constitutionality of this approach has been sustained in some states,42 but rejected in others.4
42. City of Los Angeles v. Gage, 127 Cal. App. 2d 442, 274 P.2d 34 (1954); State ex rel.
Dema Realty Co. v. Jacoby, 168 La. 752, 123 So. 314 (1929); State ex rel. Dena Realty Co.
v. McDonald, 168 La. 172, 121 So. 613 (1929); Grant v. Mayor & City Council of Baldmore, 212 Md. 301, 129 A.2d 363 (1957).
43. City of Corpus Christi v. Allen, 152 Tex. 137, 254 S.W.2d 759 (1953); Town of
Somers v. Camarco Contractors, Inc., 205 N.Y.S2d 724 (Sup. Ct. 1960), affirmed, 12 App.
Div. 2d 977, 214 N.Y.S.2d 650, modified and leave to appeal denied, 13 App. Div.2d 531,
215 N.Y.S.2d 745 (2d Dep't 1961). But see Harbison v. City of Buffalo, 176 N.Y.S.2d
598 (Ct. App. 1958).
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In Ohio, an ordinance terminating the right to continue a non-conforming use after a period determined by the city council to have been
reasonable was held to be invalid in City of Akron v. Chapman.44 The
court concluded that the ordinance, depriving the defendant of "a continued lawful use" of his property, was violative of the due process
clause of the state and federal constitutions. This case involved a junkyard. There may be a difference in treatment between uses which are
extremely offensive but which are not nuisances, and uses non-conforming to the neighborhood but not extremely offensive. It would seem,
however, that the legislative power to provide for the development and
growth of a municipality does include the power to eliminate non-conforming uses which are incompatible with area developments.
In a later case, City of Akron v. Klein,45 the court held invalid restrictions on the use of the same junk-yard involved in the Chapman
case. There are, however, suggestions by Judge Taft that would lead to
either of two possible conclusions: namely that the municipal legislative
body could prohibit the continuing use if it determined that such a business is always a nuisance in a residential neighborhood, or that it could
condemn the property and pay the owner the fair value. Where the
benefit to the public is great enough, absolute prohibition without compensation may well be valid. This approach seems to have been taken
in several states.46
An approach that seems to be more consistent with fairness and
justice is that the owner of a non-conforming use, lawful when it was
established, should not bear the economic loss of its abolition for the
benefit of neighboring properties, but that the public, which seeks the
change to improve municipal conditions, should assume the economic
burden and should compensate the owner.
Redevelopment of Individual Land Tracts
This treatment of isolated non-conforming uses appropriately suggests the possibility of dealing individually with structures which are
not non-conforming under zoning but are detrimental to the public
welfare because of existing blighted condition, or because of deteriorating conditions which if not arrested will result in blight. These structures may be located within the limits of an area for which an urban re44. 160 Ohio St. 382, 116 N.E.2d 697 (1953).
45. 171 Ohio St. 207, 168 NX.2d 564 (1960).
46. Levine v. Board of Adjustment, 125 Conn. 478, 7 A.2d 222 (1939) (junk yard); Calkins v. Ponca City, 89 Okla. 100, 214 Pac. 188 (1923) (dilapidated buildings); Shepard
v. City of Seattle, 59 Wash. 363, 109 Pac. 1067 (1910) (insane asylum). The rationale
of the Seattle case is that an insane asylum in a residential portion of a city would practically
destroy the value of all the property within its immediate vicinity for residential purposes.
If this is the controlling factor then any non-conforming use substantially affecting the value
of the adjoining property for residential purposes may well be subject to prohibition.
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newal plan has been developed, or they may be scattered. Some may be
in parts of the municipality for which it will never be necessary to project
an urban renewal plan involving mass acquisition and redevelopment.
The reported cases deal with municipal plans covering blighted
areas of substantial geographical extent, attacking the problem on an
area basis. The courts have sustained the direct acquisition of property
and elimination of such blighted areas by demolition as being a public
purpose. As areas get smaller, it may became more difficult to establish
public purpose. Stated another way, it may become easier to establish
that the project is one to aid private enterprise rather than to accomplish
a public purpose. However, where the proceedings can be shown to
be for the public welfare and the public purpose is established, there
seems to be no valid reason for questioning the acquisition of a small
blighted area and its subsequent redevelopment after clearance by the
municipality.
Is there, then, any legal objection to dealing with individual properties which threaten the public welfare and exert a depressing influence
upon a neighborhood which otherwise conforms to the standards of the
community? It is submitted that the requirement of public purpose
can be satisfied whether a large area is treated with a broad brush, or
whether a small area or individual properties are the subject of the public
program. No reported cases have been noted in which the courts have
passed on this question. However, the legality of this approach is given
considerable support by the opinion of the Supreme Court in Berman v.
7 The Court said:
Parker."
It is not for the courts to oversee the choice of the boundary line
nor to sit in review on the size of a particular project area. Once the
question of the public purpose has been decided, the amount and character of land to be taken for the project and the need for a particular
tract to complete
the integrated plan rests in the discretion of the legis4s
lative branch.

In Ohio, a municipal council exercises the legislative authority of the
state as to local government. Its determination, legislatively, that particular property is blighted and deteriorated, or is deteriorating, and must
be removed or reconditioned to protect or advance the public welfare,
will establish the public purpose. Such a determination, under the
principles applied in Grisanti,4 is not subject to veto by the judiciary,
absent fraud or bad faith.
It is not suggested that a municipality may, or should, undertake
piece-meal condemnation of homes or commercial or industrial proper47.
48.

348 U.S. 26 (1954).
Id. at 35-36.

49.

Supra notes 20, 38.
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ties for resale to private persons or corporations for redevelopment by
the latter for private purposes, without first having developed a general
plan for the community, or a part of it, looking toward the elimination
of adverse conditions of blight. Without such a plan it may be difficult
or impossible to sustain a particular acquisition as being for a public
purpose.
Conserving Open Spaces
The rather nebulous concepts of municipal planners and others who
have studied the problems of a metropolitan concentration of population,
with regard to the open space land program, have been to some extent
formalized by the enactment of Title VII, Open Space Land, of the Housing Act of 1961.'
Congress found that the rapid expansion of the
nation's urban areas has created critical problems of service and finance
for all levels of government and threatens severe problems of urban and
suburban living, including the loss of valuable open space land in such
areas. Congress determined that the purpose of this measure is
... to help curb urban sprawl and prevent the spread of urban blight and
deterioration, to encourage more economic and desirable urban development, and to help provide necessary recreational, conservation, and scenic
areas by assisting State and local governments in taking prompt action
to preserve open-space land which is essential to the proper longrange development and welfare of the Nation's urban areas, in accordance with plans for the allocation of such land for open-space purposes.51
Most of the specific purposes stated in the federal statutes are well
within the sphere of established municipal powers. 'In section 706(1)
of Tide VII, open space land is defined to mean
...any undeveloped or predominantly undeveloped land in an urban
area which has value for (A) park and recreational purposes, (B) conservation 52of land and other natural resources, or (C) historic or scenic
purposes.
Park and recreational purposes and historic sites do not seem to raise
any new problems. The acquisition of land for scenic purposes as dis50. 75 STAT. 183, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1500-1500e (Supp. 1961). The testimony before the
congressional committees indicates a great variety of views as to the reasons for having open
space and the purposes for which open space areas are to be devoted. See Housing Legislation
of 1961, HearingsBefore the Subcommittee on Housing of the Senate Committee on Banking
and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 12-13, 116-46, 321, 528, 558, 572, 593-96, 606-07, 679,
694-95, 709-10, 901-02, 920-21, 995-1049 (1961); Hearings Before the Subcommittee on
Housing of the House Committee on Banking and Currency, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 18-21,
52-53, 142-43, 202-04, 344-45, 464-66, 500, 776-77, 795-96, 862, 869-72 (1961). See
also 107 CoNG. REc. 10143, 10148, 10337-40 (daily ed. June 21, 22, 1961); S. REP. No.
281, CONF. REP. No. 602, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961).
51. 75 STAT. 183, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1500(b) (Supp. 1961).
52. 75 STAT. 185, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1500e(1) (Supp. 1961).
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tinguished from park purposes may become debatable. The remaining
purpose stated by Congress opens up an intangible and undefined area.
This relates to land which has value for "conservation of land" and
conservation of "other natural resources."
Conservation of land as a complete end in itself, and as the ultimate
purpose of the acquisition of land, would seem to fall short of the standards by which the courts will measure whether a public project is a public
purpose. It would seem that the conservation of land must be for some
specific purpose and for the public welfare. The acquisition of land or
the imposition of restrictions on land in order to create so-called land
banks or to control development or to prevent development until municipal plans have materialized, will present basic problems of public pur3
pose.
However, the acquisition of land correlated to projects or programs
serving the public welfare will unquestionably be planned as a part of
overall municipal development. Some of the particular purposes for
which land acquisition of this character is determined to be necessary
may reasonably be questioned in the courts as to whether the purpose is
beyond municipal legislative powers. In this area, it should again be
noted that Ohio municipalities are free to program and to pioneer in the
development of open space land where it serves public purposes. This
results from the complete delegation of the legislative power of the state
to municipalities in all matters of local self-government. No statutes
are necessary.
An example of the difficulties of a local agency operating only under
statutory authority to develop an open space program arose in Ohio in
1922. The Ohio Supreme Court held that a board of park commissioners, an ad hoc statutory agency of government organized to construct
and improve parks, did not have authority to restrict the use of adjoining
lands by an eminent domain proceeding, so that the owners would not
be able to develop and improve their lands without restriction and in
ways deemed by the park board to be inimical to its park development.'
The right sought to be acquired included the right to regulate and control planting and floral decorations, the right of the park board to enter
the premises for the purpose of planting slopes and hillsides, the right
to regulate and control grading and filling, the right to lay, repair, keep,
and maintain drains as might be suitable to prevent surface water from
creating swampy conditions, the right to prevent sewage or foul airs
53.

For a fuller discussion of some of the problems involved see Krasnowiecki & Paul, The

Preservation of Open Space in Metropolitan Areas, 110 U. PA. L. REv. 179 (1961); Note,
Techniques for Preserving Open Spaces, 75 HARV. L. REV. 1622 (1962).

54. Pontiac Improvement Co. v. Board of Comm'rs, 104 Ohio St. 447, 135 N.E. 635 (1922).
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from being emitted upon lands of the park board, and the right to prevent the erection or maintenance of any building, structure, fence, or wall
on the slopes and hillsides of the premises. The court denied the power
to appropriate, upon two grounds: (1) the land of the private owners
was not being taken for a use by the public or one open to the public,
and (2) the statutes authorizing the board to appropriate property did
not confer the right to appropriate the easements or interests in the land
of the character described. This holding that the Ohio Constitution
contemplates physical possession and use of the property by the public
has been limited by the Ohio Supreme Court in its decision sustaining
the power of urban renewal.55 It seems entirely likely that the court
will sustain on constitutional grounds restrictions on private development
that is harmful to the public welfare, and that the Pontiac case will be
further limited.'
The leading case of Cincinnativ. VestWr' is not adverse to the power

to acquire open spaces where the purpose is defined and the taking is for
a public purpose. That case involved excess appropriation of lands
over that actually to be occupied by the proposed improvement. Permanent injunctions restraining the appropriations were affirmed by the
Supreme Court. The rationale of the opinion is that the taking of the
excess was a taking under an ordinance which was not specific as to the
use for which the property was being taken, but simply declared that it
was "in furtherance of the public use.""8 The Court held that it was not
enough that the property to be taken might at some future date be devoted to a public use, to be then determined by council and for which
there could then be an appropriate condemnation. The Court held that
in the absence of a definition of the purpose, the appropriation must fail
because of non-compliance with a statutory requirement that the council's
determination of intention to appropriate must define the purpose of the
taking.
The case, therefore, cannot stand as authority for the proposition that
when lands are appropriated for a particular purpose, adjoining lands
may not be appropriated for other purposes in conformity with a municipality's plan of development. It does emphasize, however, the necessity
that municipal planners and municipal legislative bodies fully state the
purpose for which open space or excess lands are to be acquired, and that
such statement disclose that a public purpose is involved.
55. State ex rel. Bruestle v. Rich, 159 Ohio St. 13, 110 N.E.2d 778 (1953).
56. The case also is an important illustration of the contrast between the authority of an
agency of delegated power and an Ohio municipal corporation.
57. 281 U.S. 439 (1930).
58. Id. at 443.
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CONCLUSION

The complete delegation of municipal home rule powers means that
each municipality has the same constitutional power as all others, and
none can directly control the accomplishment of its neighbor's objectives
of government or plans or improvements. For example, a central city
may not, in developing a major airport, condemn the streets of its neighboring suburb for the purposes of the airport irrespective of the comparative value and utility to the public of the two different improvements."
On the other hand, each can indirectly interfere with its neighbor's
welfare and planning. Thus, an extensive apartment house development
in one city along its boundary line with another was the determining
factor in holding that the zoning by the neighboring municipality of the
adjacent property for single or two family residence purposes was arbitrary, unreasonable, and beyond the zoning power of the city because it
was violative of the constitutional rights of the property owners." There
was no discussion in the opinion of either the trial court or the court of
appeals as to the home rule power of Shaker Heights, in which the
plaintiff's property was located, to plan and control the land use within
the city, irrespective of the uses permitted across the boundary line in
the City of Cleveland.
This points up the responsibility of each municipality to its neighbors in planning and controlling land use. It emphasizes the necessity
for cooperative studies of problems affecting the welfare of two or more
municipalties in a metropolitan area and for cooperative seeking of adequate solutions.
In defining the objectives of government and in determining what
will best serve the public welfare of the community, Ohio municipalities
have a freedom of choice that does not seem to exist in any other state.
It cannot be said that municipalties are unable to plan and carry out
their objectives because of inadequate legislation or because the legislature, dominated by the rural representatives, will not pass enabling legislation. Ohio municipalities are not hampered by want of statutory authority. They have the power to determine for themselves the objectives
of their government, and they have at hand the legal powers of government to carry out those objectives. Aside from the constitutional limitations
imposed or authorized by the Ohio Constitution, the only limitations on
municipal freedom of choice, and initiative and enterprise in determining
and carrying out the objective of local self-government, are to be found in
lack of local leadership and aggressiveness, or in self-imposed charter
59. Village of Blue Ash v. City of Cincinnati, 173 Ohio St. 345, 182 NE.2d 557 (1962).
60. Shaker Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Heights Bd. of Zoning Appeals, 180 N.E.2d 27 (Ohio
Cr. App.), appea dismissed, 173 Ohio St. 572 (1962).
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limitations. Many municipalities have adopted charters for their government under article XVIII, section 7, of the state constitution and
exercise thereunder all powers of local self-government subject to the
provisions of article XVIII, section 3. Some of these charters restrict
the officials from undertaking and carrying out improvements without a
vote of the electors or contain other restrictions making some projects
difficult of accomplishment. Others require compliance with restrictive
state statutes. But many others vest broadly in the municipal officials
and legislative body the power to exercise all powers of the municipality.
The point is that restrictions on the freedom of choice in Ohio
municipalities are the result of local decision, and that the form of government need not be an obstacle to the achievement of the substantive
objectives of local government. In the solution of municipal problems
in Ohio, there is, therefore, the unusual opportunity to explore all new
avenues, to plan for community growth and welfare, and to protect the
inhabitants from undesirable, unhealthy, uneconomical, and ugly development.
Urban renewal in its broadest sense foreshadows an era in government control over land use that will extend far beyond traditional patterns. Further, we are on the borders of new developments as we
seek solutions to the growing problems resulting from the great concentration of population. Some of the problems are not new, but only in
recent years has there been an acceptance that older modes of regulation
are insufficient to do the job.
As new solutions are developed along the frontiers of land use control, there undoubtedly will arise situations involving judicial determination of the validity of projects or programs. In some situations such
favorable decisions may be necessary to permit financing. However, the
response of the law courts in the application of common-law principles
to changing needs of society again demonstrates the vitality of the common law. And the many decisions sustaining the newer approaches again
prove that the concept of public purpose, although incapable of precise
definition, is really but a short way of saying that whatever the public
needs for its welfare, the public will have.

